Dual Use Technology Dilemma and National Security Risks

Prof. Dr. Ashok Vaseashta, Executive Director and Chair of Institution Review Board at NJCU, USA; Professor of Professional Security Studies; Chaired Professor of Nanotechnology at the Ghitu Institute of Electronic Engineering and Nanotechnologies, Academy of Science, Moldova and Strategic Advisor to many government and non-government organizations participates in Risk Roundup to discuss “Dual Use Technology Dilemma and National Security”.   Overview Irrespective of nuclear, biological, chemical, electronic, digital, or nano; as the pace of science and technology developments is increasing exponentially; the continuing dissemination of dual-use ideas, information, innovations, inventions, materials, and equipment across nations and its cyberspace, geospace and space ecosystem; brings each one of us complex security challenges. The complex security risks emerging from cyberspace, geospace and space to each individuals and entities across nations: its governments, industries, organizations and academia (NGIOA) are compounded by the reality that the decision makers involved in technology transformation generally do not focus on fundamental issues such as “security”. As a result, if we are to build a sustainable culture of “security” in cyberspace, geospace and space, it necessitates not only making scientists, researchers, regulators and decision makers aware about dual-use of existing and emerging technologies—be it cyber weapons, electronic weapons, autonomous weapons, bio weapons, nano weapons and so on; but educating everyone–individuals and entities across NGIOA about any idea or innovation that could end up becoming dual use dilemma. Education and awareness plays a key role. Since the technology security architecture remains a source of great vulnerability, it is important that we begin to discuss “The Dual Use Technology Dilemma and National Security”. It is important that we evaluate this further: * What are Dual Use Technologies? * Is it only the deliberate misuse of dual-use technology that is a cause of concern, or the accidents and other unintended outcomes are also a cause of concern? * Who can cause harm today? What is the nature of harm that can result from the misuse of these dual use technologies? * What are the existing and emerging drivers to broaden the focus on dual use technologies? * How effectively are we managing the existing dual use technologies? What are the strategies that are working? What are the basic strategies that can be used for emerging dual use technology? * Should the decision makers apply the same strategy to different dual use technologies? * How to manage the security risks of easy to build laboratory that can produce bio weapons? What efforts are being undertaken and can be undertaken to manage biological threats? * How to prevent biological materials, equipment, or information from causing harm? Why governance of biological materials, equipment, and information is so inherently difficult? How will this be controlled? How will we govern dual use biological technology at all levels? * How to promote biological nonproliferation? How effective is the current bio-safety and bio-security program? * What are the risks of dual use biotechnology research? What are different experiments that are on-going that represents great security concerns? What steps can be taken to prevent terrorists or other nonstate actors from acquiring or using biological agents? * Should the oversight apply to only federally funded research or all research happening at all levels? * What is the current state of dual use technology governance across nations? * How are nations managing the emerging cybersecurity risks? When the use of a cyber weapon compromises the confidentiality of information that is intended to be kept secret from unauthorized parties,